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Abstract
This Essay is divided into three parts. First, it briefly discusses Augustine on the notion of a
“naturalistic morality” implanted in human minds and hearts. Second, it traces the ways in which
such notions as human nature figure in Augustinian and post-Augustinian arguments concerning
war and peace. Third, it takes the measure of our current international crises and challenges from
the perspective of human dignity the ”naturalistic morality” Augustine addresses when he insists
that there is, in fact, a nature we share, trails in its wake far-reaching ethical complications.
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INTRODUCTION
I am not, strictly speaking, a natural law thinker, so I am
particularly pleased at your generosity in inviting me to appear
as part of this venerable forum.' I have been called many things
over the course of my thirty-plus-year engagement with, and
within, the public square. Most recently, I find myself tagged an
"Augustinian political theorist."2 In light of this fact, it seems
worthwhile to unpack this Augustinian dimension and to deter-
mine how, when, and where it links up to some notion of "natu-
ral law."
Often we understand natural law in a hard or maximal form
as underwriting a deontological mode of moral reasoning3 that
assumes a very tight connection between a categorical moral
norm and human behavior, including those actions encom-
passed by the political realm.4 There is, however, a more po-
rous, less deontological way of speaking of what is given by na-
ture that co-exists comfortably with Augustinianism - certainly
with political Augustinianism. It will be the burden of this Essay
* Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics, The Univer-
sity of Chicago.
1. Originally presented at the Fordham Natural Law Colloquium on September 9,
2004, held at the Fordham University School of Law.
2. See generallyJean Bethke Elshtain, Why Augustine? Why Now?, 52 CATH. U. L. REv.
283 (2003) [hereinafter Elshtain, Why Augustine?] (highlighting aspects of Augustine's
work that have implications for political theory).
3. Deontology is a theory of moral obligation with a focus on rights and duties. It
holds that duties often correlate to, and arise from, these rights, and vice versa. See Tim
Stelizig, Deontology, Governmental Action, and the Distributive Exemption: How the Trolley
Problem Shapes the Relationship Between Rights and Policy, 146 U. PA. L. Rv. 901, 907-08
(1998). For example, "if I have a right to be punched, you are under an obligation not
to punch me, and conversely." Id. at 907.
4. See, e.g., JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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to display this mode of reasoning about nature and "the natu-
ral."
This Essay is divided into three parts. First, I will briefly dis-
cuss Augustine on the notion of a "naturalistic morality" im-
planted in human minds and hearts. Second, I will trace the
ways in which such notions as human nature figure in Augustin-
ian and post-Augustinian arguments concerning war and peace.
Third, I will take the measure of our current international crises
and challenges from the perspective of human dignity. The
"naturalistic morality" Augustine addresses when he insists that
there is, in fact, a nature we share, trails in its wake far-reaching
ethical implications.
A student of Augustine must work through the dilemma
that Augustine's version of our natures is not so "hard-wired."
That is, that the connection between nature and human deeds,
actions, norms, goods, and assessments of wrongs is not forged
with the moral equivalent of super-glue.5 The connection is
there, but it is more porous and admits of prudential judgment, 6
depending upon circumstance. The naturalistic, nature, and the
natural in the Augustinian tradition lends itself not so much to a
strong deontological account of morality and moral reasoning as
to a notion of phronesis,7 or practical reason, which lies at the
very heart of human social and political life.8 Let us turn to Au-
gustine.
I. AUGUSTINE ON NATURALISTIC MORALITY
Vdiclav Havel, former Czech President, and a political hero
5. See Elshtain, Why Augustine?, supra note 2, at 286-91 (discussing Augustine's "ap-
preciation for the chaotic nature of human existence.").
6. See Catholic Church, Catechism 2309. The term "prudential judgment" is used
in Catechism 2309 in discussing the conditions for a legitimate defense by military
force. "The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the pruden-
tial judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good." Id.
7. Aristotle first discussed phronesis, or practical wisdom, in the Nicomachean Eth-
ics. Phronesis is characterized by the use of deliberation, choice, and action, and is less
abstract than sophia, or theoretical wisdom. Phronesis focuses primarily on what should
be done in a situation. See Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 733, 744 (2004).
8. Augustine's status as a moral realist is supererogatory in the context of this Pa-
per. For Augustine, there is a there there: there are objective truths to be discovered,
honored, encoded. See JAMES WETZEL, AUGUSTINE AND THE LIMITS OF VIRTUE 10-20
(1992); see also Elshstain, Wy Augustine?, supra note 2, at 287-91 (discussing Wetzel's
finding that Augustine thinks "we can come to know certain truths.").
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of our times, notes on human behavior and the loss of respect
for others:
The relativization of all moral norms, the crisis of authority,
the reduction of life to the pursuit of immediate material
gain without regard for its general consequences - the very
things Western democracy is most criticized for - do not
originate in democracy but in that which modem man has
lost: his transcendental anchor, and along with it the only
genuine source of his responsibility and self-respect ...
Given its fatal incorrigibility, humanity probably will have to
go through many more Rwandas and Chernobyls before it
understands how unbelievably shortsighted a human being
can be who has forgotten that he is not God.9
One way that we have contrived to forget that we are not God is
to forget that we have natures. We are, we are told, just bundles
of impulses and random combinations of DNA - that is until
the genetic engineers achieve a dream of perfecting our genes
and guaranteeing nigh-perfect human products through "posi-
tive genetic enhancement." If we have genes but no natures,
there is no intrinsic connection between ourselves and our fel-
lows save that we are mammals of a certain sort who share much
of our DNA with the higher primates."° One standard plaint
goes: any talk of a specifically human nature that is not reducible
to biological and genetic predicates is so much balderdash, fash-
ioned historically in order to curb human freedom, to deny the
free expression of our polymorphously perverse sexuality, and to
hand over to rigid moralists the power to control human expres-
sion."
At the same time, paradoxically, some do talk of a human
nature, but in a reductionistic and materialist way that claims we
are hard-wired animals of no special standing.' 2 So there are two
trends if one either denies a human nature or denies that we are
the creatures of a good Creator. Either (a) we affirm a view of
9. Vdclav Havel, Forgetting That We Are Not God, 51 FIRST THINGS 47, 49-50 (1995)
available at http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9503/articles/havel.html (last visited
Feb. 21, 2005).
10. SeeJEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, WHO ARE WE? CRITIcAL REFLECTIONS AND HOPEFUL
POSSIBILITIES 88-92 (2000) (positing that undertakings such as the Human Genome Pro-
ject emphasize the physical self as the one in need of improvement).
11. See id. at 101-03 (discussing the arguments of those who would permit cloning).
12. See id. at 43-44 (discussing "perverted freedom" that leads to the individual
being seen only in terms of his utility to the community).
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our nigh infinite plasticity, or (b) we more readily embrace the
view that we are driven to maximize our reproductive strategies
given the socio-biological "laws" that determine us. 3 The plastic
person posture insists that talk of human nature denies free-
dom. 4 The evolutionary biological posture argues that the
human modifier of nature in no way alters the fact that we are
but tools in the hands a powerful bio-evolutionary force of which
we ourselves know nothing even as we do its bidding.1
5
The Augustinian argument, by contrast, is that there is a
naturalistic morality written on the hearts of God's sentient crea-
tures.1 6 By nature, no man has dominion over any other. 7 As
well, by nature, we are not evil: that entered the world through
an act of free will and is the burden all successive generations
bear and one to which they add their own deposit of sin.'"
Neither are we political by nature, although we are indeed social
creatures: the life of the saints is deeply social, Augustine tells
us. 9 The call of nature may move us into fellowship with one
13. See id. at 88-92 (criticizing the Human Genome Project as rejection of the body
itself).
14. See id. at 86-88 (discussing Christian freedom as real and limited). Christian
freedom is not opposed to natural order and acts faithfully to it. Christian freedom
consists of the ability to avoid excessive identification with culture, which lowers moral
expectations. See id.
15. See id. at 88-89 (discussing modem denials of the limits freedom via scientific
projects). The Human Genome Project, for example, is the fruit of limitless freedom,
one that proposes to control and master the human body. See id.
16. SeeJEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, AUGUSTINE AND THE LIMITS OF POLITICS 25 (1995)
[hereinafter ELSHTAIN, LIMITS OF POLITICS]. Augustine felt that humans, as God's cre-
ations, were moral by nature. They have freedom and free will to cling to God or turn
from Him, but they must choose their path. See id.; see also AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD
AGAINST THE PAGANS 476 (Henry Bettenson trans., 1972) [hereinafter AUGUSTINE, CITY
OF GOD] ("And so all nature's substances are good, because they exist and therefore
have their own mode and kind of being, and, in their fashion, a peace and harmony
among themselves.").
17. See ELSIrTAIN, LIMITS OF POLITICS, supra note 16, at 26. Since we are not politi-
cal by nature, it can not be natural that one man should dominate others. See id.; see also
AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, supra note 16, at 875 ("And yet by nature, in the condition in
which God created man, no man is the slave either of man or of sin.").
18. See ELSHTAIN, LIMITS OF POLITICS, supra note 16, at 25-26, 80, 82-83. It is not
natures that creates evil but the freedom to choose. In choosing sin, one gives into
temptation and evil results. See id.; see also, AUGUSTINE, CITY Ov GO, supra note 16, at
858 ("The philosophies hold the view that the life of the wise man should be social; and
in this we support them much more heartily.").
19. See ELSHTAIN, LIMITS OF POLITICS, supra note 16, at 96. By nature, man is not
political, but he is social. People come together, and through small acts, contribute to
social order. It is human will and design that leads to politics. See id.
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another. 2' But nature's reign is not sufficient unto itself.21
Human projects must be enacted, and they will be driven either
by caritas or cupiditas, by, in other words, right or wrong inten-
tion .22
Less well known is Augustine's insistence that one basis for
order and comity in the earthly city is the ontological, one might
say, natural, equality of men and women. 21 Augustine's claims
about men and women as equally God's creatures - and this is
a given - helps to undo antique philosophies that dictated a
separate and inferior female nature and consigned women to a
less rational and complete realm as a result. We see here and
elsewhere that presuppositions of what lies in the order of na-
ture bear profound implications for human relations, from fami-
lies to polities.24 Augustine writes that "human nature itself,
which is complete in both sexes, has been made to the image of
God, and he does not exclude the woman from being under-
stood as the image of God. 25
Let us sum up the Augustinian position thus far: There is a
human nature.26 We are all created in the image of God. 27 This
includes strange and marvelous creatures many would not think
to be sons of Adam - as Augustine repeats some of the stories
Pliny tells about odd beings who look very little like human be-
ings as we know them but, to the extent that they are social and
communicate through language, they are rightfully said to be
children of God.28 Our natures mean that we are born within
20. See id. at 35-36, 41. Basic needs, such for safety and food, move us in to fellow-
ship. See id.
21. See id. at 41. While basic human needs bring us together, this is not sufficient.
People must take the initiative to act. See id.
22. See id. The human action that is required to create a civic, political life can
take one of two paths, caritas or cupiditas. A society built on caitas will be heavenly while
one built on cupiditas will result in deepening misery. See id.
23. See id. at 39. In the household, Augustine assumed that by nature, men and
women are equal while accepting that they occupy different stations in life. The differ-
ence is dictated by natural order and convention. See id.
24. See id. at 39-41. Augustine felt that the battle between caritas and cupiditas had
deep repercussions for all aspects of human life. Repressing cupiditas leads to domestic
peace which in turn leads to civic peace. See id.
25. Id. at 44 (quoting AUGUSTINE, 12 THE TRINITY 351-52 (Catholic University of
America Press, 1992)).
26. See Elshtain, Why Augustine?, supra note 2, at 285-90 (discussing generally the
self).
27. See id. at 290.
28. See ELSHTAIN, LIMITS OF POLITICS, supra note 16, at 43. The entire human race
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and created for social life. 9
But this nature does not dictate any particular way of life if
one's reference point is a type of political regime. 0 It does un-
derscore the naturalness of certain social arrangements, includ-
ing families.31 But, in refusing to politicize family relations, Au-
gustine undercuts one of the arguments used historically to bol-
ster patriarchy as the only natural and, therefore, normatively
justifiable, mode of political organization.3 2 Augustine empha-
sizes our creatureliness; our dependencies and our interdepen-
dencies - all flow from our created natures. But, from that, we
either act in obedience to God or we disobey as did Adam and
Eve thereby committing the ur-sin that forever after mars the
human landscape. This obedience to God is not presented by
Augustine as obedience to so many stipulated "laws of nature" so
much as acting in obedience to God's call to faithfulness, open-
ness to grace, and love for the mediator, the second person of
the Trinity, that God sends down to us so that we might rise to
Him.
II. HOW DOES NATURE FIGURE INTO POST-AUGUSTINE
JUST WAR ARGUMENTS?
It is a truism to describe the just war tradition as rich and
complex, heavily sedimented over with the soot and sands of
time. My task is not to assay this history so much as to reflect on
whether "natural law," in either a "hard" or soft version, plays
any part at all in the origins, and the continuing story, of the
just, or justified, war tradition. The answer is yes, but it is a yes
that requires explanation.
Given that early just war theory emerged from the theologies
belongs to one category-human-because God created all, even those bizarre crea-
tures most resistant to being called human. Augustine discussed these bizarre creatures
described in Pliny's Natural History. If these creatures are moral and rational, they are
human. See id.
29. See id. at 26. A common need for food, shelter, etc., brings humans together in
to a relationship that is first social. See id.
30. See Elshtain, Why Augustine?, supra note 2, at 291-92. Political life is a form
assumed by human social and ethical life. Human sociality is innate and is sought
through the social forms created by people. No specific social order is dictated, how-
ever, and no human has dominion over another. Rather, civic order is an expression of
out natures. See id.
31. See id. at 292-93. Augustine believed that by nature, the father is the household
authority but in politics, where one is subject to a ruler, it is not by nature. See id.
32. See id.
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of St. Ambrose of Milan 33 and of the great Augustine,34 it would
be nigh unthinkable that human nature, fallen and redeemed,
would play no role in just war argument. I have already noted
Augustine's wonderfully generous definition of humanity - the
entire sentient human race belongs within one category, the
human, for God created us all, male and female, diverse races,
even bizarre creatures most of us would scarcely call human.
Fine, you might say, but how does this cash out ethically?
We begin with the self. God did not begin with the human
species but with singularity. With other creatures, whether those
of solitary habit "who walk alone and love solitude," or those who
are "gregarious, preferring to live in flocks and herds, God "com-
manded many to come into existence at once."35 But not so the
human person. Here God created "one individual; but that did
not mean that he was to remain alone, bereft of human society.
God's intention was that in this way the unity of human society
and the bonds of human sympathy be more emphatically
brought home to man, if men were bound together not merely
by likeness in nature but also by feeling of kinship."36 Spread
out upon the face of the earth, living under many customs and
distinguished by a "complex variety of languages, arms, and
dress," all participate in that fellowship we call human society; all
are marked by the point of origin from one; all are called to
membership in the two cities.
The importance of plurality, of the many emerging from a
unique one, cannot be underestimated in Augustine's work.
Emerging from "one" creates a fragile bond of peace, or relative
peacefulness. Bonds of affection tied human beings from the
33. Bishop of Milan, c. 339-97. Credited in part for converting Augustine to Chris-
tianity, Ambrose baptized Augustine in 386 and is recognized as one of four traditional
Doctors of the Latin Church. His well-known written works include DE SACRAMENTIS
and DE OFFICIIS MINISTRORUM (a treatise on Christian ethics based largely on Cicero).
See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 49 (E.A. Livingstone ed., 1997).
34. Lecturing at Columbia University in 1954, the medievalist Professor Dino
Bigongiari specifically credited Augustine with the earliest articulation of "just war" the-
ory ("[W] e must not forget that St. Augustine himself has given us the Christian theory
of a just war."), and noted that Augustine's spiritual theory later played a significant
role in the persecution of heretics, the Crusades, and modern Roman Catholic doc-
trine. See Dino Bigongiari, The Political Ideas of St. Augustine, Lecture at Columbia
University (1954), reprinted in THE POUTICAL WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 3434 (Henry
Paolucci ed., 1962) (1954).
35. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, supra note 16, at 502.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 498-502.
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start. Bonds of kinship and affection bound them further. The
more these relationships are dispersed, finally encompassing the
entire globe, and in light of the confusion and confounding of
human languages, the more difficult it is to repair to this funda-
mental kinship or sociality in order to strike a blow for a decent
civic order and against anarchy and random violence. For Au-
gustine understands just how estranged we are. He tells us it is
often easier to have fellowship with one's dog than with some-
one whose language one does not understand. 8 Nevertheless,
there is something like a common nature and it is this thread of
commonality that supports both individuals and plurality.
Issues of war and peace are played out in the saeculum, the
historic present between creation and the end-time. An imper-
fect but nonetheless real earthly peace lies within the realm of
the possible. 9 The Heavenly City's image of perfect peace, how-
ever, does not lie within our reach.40 At the same time, peace
itself can never be endorsed uncritically. For Augustine offers a
withering critique of the injustices that traffic under the name of
peace.4 And justice is what is at stake in any discussion of war
and peace - a justice that repairs to our fragile bonds of social-
ity and seeks to mend bonds that have already been broken or
frayed by violent acts. Ambrose, Augustine, later Aquinas, all are
associated with the just war tradition, and all regarded their ar-
guments as a consistent evolution from early Christian teaching,
not a deviation from it. 4 2
They knew that in a fallen world, filled with imperfect
human beings, we cannot achieve perfection in earthly domin-
ion, or religious life, or in anything else and that - even more
important - we all have a responsibility to and for one another
to serve and to love our neighbors.43 If our neighbor is being
38. See id. at 861 ("So true is this that a man would be more cheerful with his dog
for company than with a foreigner.").
39. The feasibility of an earthly peace can be inferred, in Augustine's writing, from
Augustine's own confident description of the motives that drive human existence. See,
e.g., id. at 865-70 ("Peace is the instinctive aim of all creatures, and is even the ultimate
purpose of war.").
40. See id. at 75 ("true justice is found only in that commonwealth whose founder
and ruler is Christ .... ").
41. See generally Elshtain, Why Augustine?, supra note 2.
42. See JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, JUST WAR AGAINST TERROR: THE BURDEN OF AMERI-
CAN POWER IN A VIOLENT WORLD 51 (2003) (discussing the works these authors as con-
sistent with Christian teaching).
43. See id. at 51 (discussing the duty of humans toward one another in a fallen
world).
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slaughtered, or systematically and continuingly crushed by the
heavy hand of an intolerable oppression, the just use of force
and the vocation of soldiering rise to the fore as options to
which we may be urged, perhaps even commanded, by a God of
justice.4 4
What is forbidden to the individual - use of lawless vio-
lence against another - is sanctioned for the social body, in the
form of rule-governed use of force, and in and through the of-
fices of statesmen and women and soldiering in a just cause.4 5
Augustine's account of love - or the ways we are enjoined to
love one another - feeds directly into his approach to the ethics
and morality of war. Lest this sound suspiciously Orwellian - I
love my neighbor and therefore I must fight - it needs more
fleshing out.
The Christian just war tradition is built on both charity and
justice.
Charity - love of God and neighbor - compels Christians to
seek justice for their neighbors. The just war tradition pro-
vides the Church [for originally the teaching was for and
within the Church] with the means to determine how justice
is to be sought and the grounds for penalizing those who
stray too far from its prohibitions.46
The criteria for ajustifiable war - the jus ad belium - have been
spelled out many, many times by myself and others. One might
summarize these as: acting under right authority, having a just
cause, fighting with the right intention, a reasonable hope of
success, and war as the best available means to right, or to pre-
vent, a grievous wrong. (This got translated over time as "last
resort," although last resort did not really figure in the thinking
of Ambrose, Aquinas, or Augustine.)
Just war, then, is driven by a call to justice that is embedded
in an account of our natures, created and fallen. The aim is to
repair that which has been torn asunder by a prior violence and
to protect a community for which one has responsibility, or
both. For Augustine, one can never get away from original sin
but that does not preclude seeking right order -justice - be-
44. See id. at 52.
45. See Elshtain, Why Augustine?, supra note 2, at 299 (discussing neighborly love as
a justification for a war of protection).
46. ALEXANDER F.C. WEBSTER & DARRELL COLE, THE VIRTUE OF WAR: RECLAIMING
THE CLASSIC CHRISTIAN TRoITIONS EAST AND WEST 47 (2004).
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tween peoples and between peoples and God.47 The earthly city
must hold violence in check.48 Fighting under rules of engage-
ment - the jus in bello - in order to minimize civilian casual-
ties, can help to create or to protect the safe surround that per-
mits ordinary civic peace to flourish.49 The force brought to
bear as an instrument of justice cannot be uncontrolled vio-
lence. It is not private violence. It is the use of force at the be-
hest of right authority.
For Augustine, a resort to force may, as I have noted, be an
obligation of caritas or neighbor love."0 An offense that triggers
a forceful response may be suffered by a third party. Why should
one care? One cares because our ethical obligations extend to
all qua human, hence marked by the imago dei.51 This applies to
all without exception. We do not owe identical ethical obligations
to all - some of our ethical obligations are "thicker" than others
- but none is to be permitted to wander in a violent state of
nature outside the boundaries of moral concern. So the war to
be resorted to in order to preserve or to achieve peace is not just
any peace (for there can be a peace of the desert, too) but a just
peace that leaves the world better off than it was prior to the
resort to force.12 Again, the nonviolence obligatory at the indi-
vidual level is reversed at the level of social life where the resort
47. See ELSHTAIN, LIMITS OF POLITICS, supra note 16, at 91-94 (explaining that Au-
gustine "agrees that the earthly city is 'marked' or 'stained' by sin," but that he "be-
lieved, as many Augustinian scholars have observed, that he had uncovered the lowest
common denominators of human existence in the saeculum: a need for social life,
hence a need for peace and order. .. ").
48. See Augustine, CITY OF GOD, supra note 16, at 877-78 ("The earthly city, whose
life is not based on faith, aims at an earthly peace...
49. See id. at 866-70.
50. See generally Elshtain, Why Augustine?, supra note 2, at 299.
51. Imago dei is Latin for "Image of God." According to Genesis and elsewhere, man
was created in the image of God. See Genesis 1:26 (King James). The term "Image of
God" was fundamental to the patristic understanding of the human person. Prior to St.
Augustine, the primary significance of the expression "Image of God" was in the Son
himself - man being a derived image of God, created in accordance with the Image,
i.e., the Son. St. Augustine brought about a new influential development in the doc-
trine of the image. See OxFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 820 (E.A. Living-
stone ed., 1997) ("[T]he notion of the Son as the Image was dismissed as subordina-
tionist and man's soul came to be regarded as a direct image of the Holy Trinity, mani-
festing a threefold structure in memory, understanding, and will.").
52. SeeJean Bethke Elshtain, Conference: The Third Annual Grotius Lecture: Just War
and Humanitarian Intervention, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1, 7 (2001) [hereinafter Elshtain,
Just War] ("Be certain before you intervene, even in ajust cause, that you have a reason-
able chance of success. Don't make a bad situation worse.").
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to controlled use of force may be mandated.53 Precisely because
of the harrowing sacrifice made to redeem us from the bondage
of sin, we must bind ourselves to defend and to protect others -
as a response to organized, continuing and systematic violence
or the imminent threat of such.5 4
Just war flows from caritas in the interest of a just pax or
peace.55 Thus, one might say that there was no peace for the
Iraqi people under the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein. It
would be cruel and preposterous to claim any such thing. Some
three-hundred mass graves of the slaughtered have been un-
earthed and a political scientist has estimated that one could
have expected an approximate 16,000 Iraqis per year to be killed
or to die at the hands of the regime on a regular basis.56 The
United Nations' own figures on deaths of Iraqi children under
the scandal of the oil for food and medicine program ran
upwards to 60,000 Iraqi children per year as direct victims of the
regime.57
Whatever one thinks of Operation Iraqi Freedom, these are
harsh facts that must be grappled with precisely because of the na-
tures we share with others, because of the dignity of all peoples
that Christians are pledged to respect, to honor, and to uphold.
Concern for human dignity is a bright thread that runs through
all humanitarian interventions or calls to "rescue" persons being
harried, tortured, and destroyed. 5' To me, this speaks to the nat-
uralistic morality in the first instance - not nature in the Dar-
winian sense but nature in the theological sense. Our morally
53. See generally Joseph E. Capizzi, On Behalf of the Neighbor, 14(2) STUD. IN CHRIS-
TIAN ETHICS 87-108 (2002).
54. See Elshtain, Just War, supra note 52, at 4 ("Protecting citizens from harm is a
fundamental norm .... ").
55. See generally, Elshtain, Why Augustine?, supra note 2, at 287 ("Such beliefs in the
true nature of things are viewed through complex indirection and love, or caritas, which
is a formed desire and a selfless goodness that spills over the boundaries of the self and
reaches out to others and to God, who is the source of love.").
56. See Gerard Alexander, A Lifesaving War, 9 WuL STANDARD, Mar. 29, 2004, avail-
able at http://weeklystandard.com/content/public/articles/000/000/003/889tngrz.
asp?pg-2 (noting that 16,000 Iraqi children died a year between 1979 and March 2003).
57. See Helle Dale, Food for Fraud; UN-Sadaam Profiteering, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 21,
2004, available at http://www.defenddemocracy.org/in-themedia/in the_media_
show.htm?doc-id=222446 (stating that 5,000 children were harmed each month,
amounting to 60,000 a year).
58. See Elshtain, Just War, supra note 52, at 7 ("Humanitarian intervention comes
under the category of saving innocents from certain harm, or, as it is now more com-
monly called, those in need of rescue.").
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inscribed natures are offended when we see people systemati-
cally ill-dignified. We arrive at our sense of justice through our
God-given reason. In sum, you cannot understand the just war
tradition in full unless you make certain that that piece called
"human nature" is fitted into the puzzle.
III. AUGUSTINIAN NATURE, JUST WAR, AND OUR
CURRENT SITUATION
Often, in discussions of just war and Christianity, most re-
cently in an interview with the BBC, I am confronted with some
question as: "If all this is Christian, why should it be obligatory
on anyone else?"59 For the following reasons: The call to pro-
tect one's neighbor, to prevent systematic, egregious, and con-
tinuing harm has made its way systematically into international
law, the law of armed conflict, and calls to humanitarian inter-
vention." I have called the principle of human dignity involved
one of "equal regard" - an equal regard that must sometimes
be backed up by coercive force.
The person who helped to effect the transition from an ex-
plicit theological argument to a set of normative claims in-
formed tacitly by theology was, of course, Hugo Grotius, a Dutch
Calvinist in his famous On the Laws of War and Peace, published in
1625.61 Grotius took it as stipulated that states
have first and foremost the right to defend themselves. And,
tangentially just as a society of human beings has the right to
punish a member who has committed a crime against an-
other, so a [N] ation or a group of [N] ations have the right to
punish a [S] tate or ruler that has injured another unjustly.6 2
The theological virtue of charity informed Grotius' work, hence
it has a foundation in God's commands and calls to humankind,
as well as in notions of a jus gentium, a secular law of the peoples,
59. See Just Wars or Just More Wars? (BBC Radio Broadcast, Aug. 19, 2004), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/programmes/analysis/ transcripts/ 19_08_
04.txt (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
60. See id.
61. See Huco GROTIus, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS [On the Laws of War and Peace]
(A.C. Campbell trans., 1814), available at http://constitution.org/gro/djbp.htm (last
visited Mar. 29, 2005).
62. CALEB CARR, THE LESSONS OF TERROR 79 (2002) (summarizing the position of
Grotius). According to Grotius, this right to punish is limited by the rules of civil soci-
ety. See id.
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as encoded in Justinian's Corpus Iuris Civili. 6 3 We see, then, that
the cluster of permissions and inhibitions we call just war are
forged from the notions of a human nature underlying pre-
Christian, Greek, and Latin writers and then the powerful theo-
logical jolt to these notions offered by Christianity's account of
created and fallen human natures.6 4 The theological ambience
within which just war theory continues to be played out, to the
extent that we believe the innocents of whatever Nation, relig-
ion, race, or ethnicity make a claim on us by virtue of our shared
natures, is, then, that of caritas, neighbor regard.65 To the extent
that natural law says important things about both charity andjus-
tice, to that extent it is woven into the warp and woof ofjust war
- so long as one keeps in mind the important caveat that pru-
dence must always be a part of any decisions to go to war.6 6
CONCLUSION: DO WE HAVE OUT NATURES YET?
Think back to what I said about theologically grounded no-
tions of human nature and just war. These notions make it pos-
sible, even exigent, to enact projects ofjustice, spurred by caritas,
that necessitate - or may - the use of armed force.67 At the
63. See WEBSTER & COLE, supra note 46, at 165.
64. SeeJohn Witte, Jr., Law, Religion and Human Rights, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REv. 1 (1996) (describing the role of Christianity in forging notions of natural law); see
also Jan Arno Hessbruegge, The Historical Development of the Doctrines of Attribution and Due
Diligence in International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 265 (2004) (stating that Gro-
tius derived many of his notions of charity from principles ofjus gentium).
65. See ELSHTAIN, LIMITS OF POLITICS, supra note 16, at 39. I have previously noted
that:
Friendship ... is the glue that forges our human ties, it binds husband and
wife, brother and sister, friend to friend, citizen to citizen even in the limited
and flawed realm of earthly life.... Human society in all its aspects is twisted
by life within unjust and oppressive earthly dominions and the conceptions
under which these dominions order their rule. A Ciceronian definition of a
people as a number of persons associated by common acknowledgement of
certain rules... is inadequate, simply not up to the task of recognizing the
work of caritas. Rather... we must look to an assemblage of persons bound
together by common agreement as to the objects of love.
Id. See generally AuGusTINE, CITY OF GOD, supra note 16, at 593-94, 877-78 (comparing
the two loves - caritas and cupiditas - and celebrating the former's capacity to gather
together all pilgrims into a perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God and of
one another in God).
66. SeeJames V. Schall, On the Justice and Prudence of This War, 51 CATH. U. L. REv. 1
(2001) (stating that war must be entered into with thought and consideration).
67. See AuGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, supra note 16, at 866 ("wars are waged with peace
as their object").
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same time, these notions of human nature and what justifies the
use of force impose clear limits to what one can or should do in
the name of both justice and caritas.6 s Just war rejects the notion
that in time of war the laws fall absent and this rejection is based
in important part on often tacit assumptions about what sorts of
creatures we are, hence what can, or should, be done in our
names - whether to us or in our behalf.69
If we jettison any notion of a human nature all bets are off.
We can do whatever we want, whatever our techniques make pos-
sible.
We move in very deep waters indeed when we take up na-
ture and the natural. If one does not believe that a "natural law"
and a stipulated and absolutely clear-cut "policy choice" are
linked together inexorably - and I am in that camp - the work
one has to do is considerable."' For one embraces simultane-
ously the multiple possibilities of our natures - both limits and
openings to transformations consistent with our dignity and with
equal regard for all that always, necessarily, fall short of any stan-
dard of perfection.7 Even as perfecting our natures is beyond
us, so is perfect justice. In the realm of force, a drive to achieve
perfect justice, to create a world of neo-Kantian republics in the
liberal-humanist vision of things, may also erode limits to the jus-
tifiable use of force; limits, therefore, to what we are permitted
to do even in the name of justice.
68. SeeJAMES WETZEL, AUGUSTINE AND THE LIMITS OF VIRTUE 20 (1992) (stating that
Augustine disregards standards set by human minds).
69. See ELSHTA1N, LIMITS OF POLITICS, supra note 16, at 111. It should be noted that
St. Augustine taught: war and strife, however just the cause, stir up tempta-
tions to ravish and to devour, often in order to ensure peace. Just war is and
must remain a cautionary tale of domestic and international order, a story of
the requirements and purposeful uses of power and order. In this world of
discontinuities and profound yearnings, of sometimes terrible necessities, a
human being can yet strive to maintain or to create an order that approxi-
mates justice, to prevent the worst from happening, and to resist the seductive
lure of imperial grandiosity.
Id.
70. See RONALD DwoRMaN, LAw'S EMPIRE, 95-96, 313-54 (1986) (noting that the
term "natural law" can denominate any number of related, yet distinct, legal philoso-
phies and that these various perspectives toward law all hold to the basic natural law
tenet that a necessary overlap must exist between law and morality).
71. See AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, supra note 16, at 471-73 (explaining that the na-
ture of angels and man, both good and bad, is one in the same).
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